Is there any hope for peace building In Afghanistan?

by Isaac Kfir
October 13, 2010

http://www.weeklyblitz.net/1034/is-there-any-hope-for-peace-building-in

In 2001, as a reaction to the September 11 terror attacks, the United States led an international campaign to capture those members of al-Qa'ida responsible for the attacks. A second objective focused on rebuilding Afghanistan so that after decades of conflict, its people would have a better future. However, despite a huge commitment by the international community, Afghanistan remains highly unstable and volatile. This article explores the reasons the international effort in Afghanistan has failed to deliver peace, security, and stability.

Peace, security, and stability continue to evade Afghanistan despite the presence of over 100,000 foreign troops and a burgeoning Afghan national army and police force. In addition, even though the country has received billions in aid and assistance, its social, economic, and political systems remain in a dire state, with Afghans themselves showing little faith in the reconstruction efforts.

The U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, supported by the international community, had two aims. The first was to capture or kill Usama bin Ladin along with senior al-Qa'ida and Taliban members. The second aim was to end Afghanistan's incessant instability through "peacebuilding."

The strategy initially seemed to work as senior Taliban and al-Qa'ida activists escaped the onslaught of Operation Enduring Freedom by going to Pakistan and other locations or surrendering to coalition forces, thereby creating the notion that the strategy was correct and appropriate. The "peacebuilding" effort also appeared to be on track; following international meetings in Bonn (2001) and Tokyo (2002), an Afghan Interim Administration was established. The process toward rebuilding Afghanistan also appeared to be moving forward, with preparation for elections and the adoption of an Afghan constitution.

However, the optimism was masked by the fact that things were slowly unraveling, as disparity between the mission's goals and what was possible became clearer. Professor Anatol Lieven, Chair of International Relations and Terrorism Studies in the War Studies Department, King's College, London and a Senior Fellow of the New America Foundation, writing in 2007, pointed out that the efforts in Afghanistan were never likely to succeed because the strategies pursued by the international community were incompatible. Lieven identified five strategies the international community was seeking:

1. Victory in the war against the Taliban.

2. The transformation of Afghanistan into an effective and democratic state.

3. Eliminating or undermining Afghanistan's ability to serve as terrorist base.

4. Reducing Afghanistan's position as the world's leading opium provider.

5. Preserving NATO as a meaningful international military organization.

In 2010, there appears to be no end to the conflict in Afghanistan. So great is the frustration that several contributing countries have called for a strategy that includes such ideas as speaking with "Moderate Taliban" or withdrawal. Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign secretary declared, "The solution to a war is always to talk to your enemies, unless one party triumphs." Kouchner and others stress that the Afghan Taliban is a heterogeneous force, raising the prospect that one could persuade some Taliban to switch allegiance, with Islamism giving way to post-Islamism.

Linked to the desire to speak with "Moderate Taliban" is the growing unpopularity of the Afghan War among the contributing countries and the belief that the war itself is "unwinnable." These changes compelled General David Petraeus, commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Force Commander (USFOR-A) to engage in a "media blitz" to persuade Americans--as the largest contributors to the operation--not to abandon Afghanistan so that it would not revert to being the terrorist sanctuary that it was under the Taliban.

Although this is a laudable consideration, it fails to reflect a number of realities: First, Islamist terrorists no longer need Afghanistan, as there are many other locations that they can use for their campaign, starting with the Pakistan's North West Frontier Province located next to Afghanistan; Islamist terrorists also have Somalia in the Horn of Africa and Yemen in the Arabian Peninsula. In other words, there are plenty of "ungoverned territories" providing Islamist terrorists with places from which they can launch attacks against the West.

Second, it remains unclear how much of a threat Islamist terrorism of the al-Qa'ida mode poses to the international community, especially with the increase in home-grown radicalism.

Third, it is doubtful as to whether the international community can salvage the situation in Afghanistan with the tools at its disposal: continuous reliance on Hamid Karzai, a commitment to fight the insurgency within the parameters of the Laws of Armed Conflict, as well as a policy of reconstruction that centers on show rather than functionality--as was shown with the September 2008 British operation to transport 220 tons of equipment to the Kajaki dam, Helmand Province, which created much fanfare but has limited value.

Ultimately, these issues require a look at the way the international community has and is approaching the peacebuilding aspect of the operation in Afghanistan. To that end, the analysis opens with the UN approach to "peacebuilding" even though the UN has a minimal role in Afghanistan. The UN Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) is quintessentially a political mission, though Security Council Resolution 1401 (2002) made UNAMA the focal point for international assistance to Afghanistan in the post-Bonn period. The UN's importance was emphasized by the role played by Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan at the time of the U.S.-led invasion. Brahimi was a major actor in the Bonn talks that shaped post-Taliban Afghanistan. In addition, the UN model for peacebuilding can be helpful, as the UN is a leader in the field.

The second section reviews some of the key issues affecting Afghanistan to better appreciate the challenge that Afghanistan poses to those wanting to undertake successful peacebuilding. The focus is on three main issues: Afghanistan's geography and history; its ethnic composition as well as the legacy of the Afghan jihad (1979 to 1988); and the civil war, (1990 to 1998, by which point the Taliban controlled the majority of Afghanistan).

The final two sections explore the "peacebuilding" strategy in Afghanistan to understand why the situation remains so dire in the country before concluding with some general observations as to likelihood of success of the operation.

THE UN'S APPROACH TO PEACEBUILDING:

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 compelled the UN Security Council, no longer trapped by Cold War politics, to request Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provide it with recommendations as to how to improve and strengthen the UN's capabilities in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and for peacekeeping. The council realized that with the end of the Cold War, the UN could and would assume the role of maintaining international peace and security, which many had hoped for it in 1945. Significantly, despite Cold War politics--which greatly undermined the organization--the UN was the major progenitor of humanitarian assistance (operating under the guise of maintaining international peace and security) through its various peacekeeping operations as devised by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Canada's Lester B. Pearson.

The Hammarskjöld-Pearson peacekeeping formula was about providing security to facilitate sustainable peace after the signing of a ceasefire or a peace accord, allowing for the promotion of some reconstruction and stability in war-torn societies as a product of the presence of the peacekeepers in the area. The end of the Cold War permitted the organization to move away from this limited type of peacekeeping operations toward "complex peace operations" that embraced humanitarianism and nation-building. In the early 1990s, humanitarianism moved from "the impartial relief to victims of manmade and natural disasters…" (what it did during the Cold War) to covering such things as the promotion and protection of human rights, access to medicine, economic development, democracy promotion, as well as state-building.

The shift in "peacekeeping" was captured in Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace, which stood for a more expansive, interventionist UN policy. An Agenda for Peace also looked at the challenge of "post-conflict peace-building," understood as the way to prevent renewed conflict after peace agreements, ceasefire agreements, or cessation of violence. Boutros-Ghali and others saw "post-conflict peacebuilding" as integral in achieving one of the fundamental aims of the UN: saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war, because certain conflicts if not resolved tend to continue and become wider threats to international peace and security. Thus, under the new paradigm, the UN would galvanize the international community to "fix" states engaged in conflict.

The 1990s was the era of intervention for the UN. It believed that a strong financial and personnel commitment made possible state reconstruction and nation-building, which would lead to sustainable peace, which in turn would enhance international peace and security. By the end of the decade, however, serious questions emerged regarding the approach since many of the operations had "failed." Extensive reform in UN peacekeeping led to a reduction in operations, although it did not reduce the international community's enthusiasm toward promoting "positive peace"--eliminating the root causes of conflict as actors in a conflict use other tools (non-violent) to resolve their differences. Thus, ironically, although the international community reduced its multilateral interventions, its commitment to active intervention and the need to reduce conflict remained. The issue of intervention and the search for peace gained importance following September 11, intensifying the debate regarding the circumstances under which military intervention was legal and moral.

Afghanistan, which is not a UN peace operation, encapsulates many of the issues affecting peacebuilding since one of the mission's goals is to build Afghanistan into a viable, functioning state. The UN's Afghan campaign centers on the belief that in order to achieve sustainable peace in Afghanistan, the country has to be rebuilt, not only structurally but socially and culturally, developing a political system that embraces Afghan diversity (positive peace). Such an approach seeks to remove the conditions that had encouraged Afghans to turn to the Taliban--chaos, lawlessness, and human insecurity--following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and fall of the Mohammad Najjibullah government in 1992. This is why the UN demanded that the program be Afghan-led. Lakhdar Brahimi, special representative of the secretary-general for Afghanistan argued, "Neither the UN nor anyone else, no matter how sincere, may substitute themselves for the Afghans and solve the problems of Afghanistan for them." Brahimi added: "If the Afghan authorities and their international partners set realistic objectives; if the international community has the determination and patience to do what it takes to really help the situation; if, at the same time, we have the humility to realize that we are no wiser than Afghans about what is better for Afghanistan, then there is every reason for optimism."

UNDERSTANDING AFGHANISTAN:

Afghanistan's geographical location has made it one of the most important countries in the world, yet its topography has made it one of the hardest to govern. The country's rough terrain--high mountains, isolating fertile valleys, deserts, and wild rivers--has led to ethnically diverse pockets of population and isolation between groups. In addition to the geography, the harsh climate (brutal winters and very hot summers) requires groups keep within their settlements. This has led to strong internal loyalties within communities, which enables them to withstand these conditions and protects the group from any invaders seeking to take control of the area the group resides in. So limited is access to the outside world, that Nancy Hatch Dupree has argued individuals in Afghanistan live and die in their home valleys, unaware of what is around them. When globalization and modernization came to Afghanistan, they created many problems for a society that fostered traditionalism by challenging the communal codes the society lived under. For example, modernization allowed young men to leave the village to work in the towns, where they could earn more money. Upon their return, their new status undermined the position of the elders.

Linked to Afghanistan's population and its dispersion are the country's borders, another core reason for Afghan instability. In the northern part of the country there are Turkic, Tajik, and Uzbek people who have more in common with Central Asia than with their southern brethren. They used to live as part of a single province known as Turkistan, but in 1967, the Afghan government introduced reforms that created smaller provinces (Balkh, Jawzjan, Samangan, and Farya) to weaken the non-Pashtun people. In the West, Afghanistan shares a border with Iran and inhabitants of the area speak the same Farsi dialect as those living in eastern Iran. The Baluchs spread across three states--southern Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan--while in the east and southeast there is a heavy concentration of Pashtun, although they are far from homogenous, as intra-Pashtun tensions often undermine their cohesion.

Afghanistan has a powerful neighbor, Pakistan, which is responsible for much of the instability. Pakistanis see Afghanistan as offering "strategic depth" against India. Islamabad has always striven to have a pliable or pro-Pakistani government in Kabul, in case India launches an attack against Pakistan. A pro-Islamabad government in Kabul means Pakistan will be able to use Afghanistan to launch a counter-offensive against India. In other words, Pakistan's surreptitious intercession in Afghanistan stems from a Pakistani sense of insecurity that comes from the nature of the Pakistani state, which sees India as the biggest threat to its survival.

Since 2001, Pakistan has come under tremendous scrutiny regarding its involvement in Afghanistan, including its role in establishing and sponsoring the Taliban and other militant Islamists in Afghanistan. Yet this has not stopped Pakistani meddling in Afghan affairs, because it is seen as vital to Pakistan's survival, raising the question as to whether Pakistan would it stop meddling in Afghan affairs if it were no longer feared. The second issue facilitating and provoking Pakistani intervention in Afghan affairs stems from the Durand Line, the controversial border drawn in the 1890s between the two countries (at the time it divided Afghanistan and British India), splitting the Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghans historically have sought to have the border renegotiated.

The large Afghan refugee community in Pakistan has added to tension between the two countries, as problems for Pakistan include the establishment of illegal settlements (katchi abadis) on state land and tensions with the indigenous population since refugees are willing to work for less. The presence of a large Pashtun (Pakistani-born) community that continues to demand a Pashtun state has created concern for Pakistani policymakers, because there is a large community within Pakistan whose allegiances lie with a foreign body or with an idea that will break up Pakistan.

Fear of secession is very real for Pakistan, itself the product of the 1947 secession from India and the defection of the country's eastern section in 1971 to become Bangladesh. The Pakistani leader Zia al-Haq was interested in linking Pashtuns on both sides of the 2,400 kilometer-long Afghan-Pakistan border into a Pakistani-controlled area. Zia's Islamist orientation encouraged the Islamization of the Pashtun tribes challenging traditional leaders. As young men fighting the Soviets became powerful, they undermined the elders and advocated a more dogmatic form of Wahhabi or Deobandi Islam. This did not challenge Pashtun identity, which has remained an important force in Afghan politics, but created new tensions and gulfs within a society where it does not take much to cause a conflict.

Afghanistan has major ethnic and religious cleavages undermining unity and Afghan nationalism, leading the noted British academic Anthony Hyman to declare, "The Afghans are neither one people nor one political community, while the state itself is broken-backed and the country divided between two rival governments: a Taliban-ruled state competes for control of northern regions under mutually rival warlords. Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian divisions have worsened and further fragmented the country." This state of affairs is a result of the way Ahmed Shah Durrani created the Afghan "state" through conquest and guile. However, incessant intra-dynastic feuds coupled with the rise of Sikh power under Ranjit Sikh--not to mention British penetration into the subcontinent leading to the "Great Game"--left Afghanistan even more divided and perpetually weak as Britain and Russia courted Afghan leaders and provided them with stipends. This did not encourage Afghan leaders to develop a viable, legitimate Afghan state that could survive on its own, as they opted to use the money to fight off challengers, buy challengers off, or simply live a life of luxury. When Afghanistan became independent in 1921, the "Great Game" legacy remained as Afghan leaders continued to rely on either Britain or the Soviet Union to survive--seen with the treaty Afghanistan signed with the British following the end of the Third Afghan War (1919) and the 1921 Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. The internal tensions that had existed in Afghanistan throughout the twentieth century were exacerbated by the Afghan jihad, as the mujahidin were divided along ethnic lines, which meant that the factions often fought one another and not only the Soviets and the Afghan communist government.

Today, the Pashtuns dominate Afghanistan making up around 40 percent of the population. The other key ethnic groups in Afghanistan are the Tajiks, Hazaras, and the Uzbeks. Pashtun dominance is such that even the names of the Afghan parliament are Pashtu--Wolesi Jirga (Council of the People) and Meshrano Jirga (Council of the Elders). However, the Pashtun are heterogeneous, with long historical roots (Herodotus refers to them as Partika). Their lives are governed by Pashtunwalli, laws that emphasize honor (nang) and revenge (badal­) on anything perceived by an individual to challenge his honor. Linked to the Pashtunwalli is the Pashtun commitment to self-rule, heightened by their warrior-like nature that craves independence, for which they are willing to fight and die if necessary.

In addition to Pashtunwalli, what makes the modern Pashtun such a potent force is Islam, with many adopting dogmatic and uncompromising views coupled with a desire to attain martyrdom raising their fighting potential. Pashtun trace their adoption of Islam to Qais bin Rashid of Ghor, who they claim was converted to Islam by the prophet himself. Yet historically while the Pashtuns were conservative Muslims, they were not dogmatic nor did they practice Deobandi or Whabbi Islam. Donald Wilber, an experienced traveler in Muslim states, upon visiting Afghanistan in the early 1950s, noted:

"Prayer is an important feature of daily life. Buses and trucks halt along the road at times of prayer; and the sunset prayer, when all the passengers align themselves in rows…. The manufacture, sale, and use of alcohol are forbidden: violators are severely punished by law, and in a country famed for its countless varieties of grapes no wine is made."

The importance of Islam in Afghan society has arguably increased because as the state fails to provide basic security, Afghans turn to Islamic practices such as zakat (alms giving) and the qadis (judges) as solutions to their hard existence. Put simply, the Islamization of Afghanistan has made an already conservative Muslim population far more resistant to change and foreign ideas, especially when these ideas are seen as corrupting (fasid). This attitude explains opposition to some of the changes demanded by the international community though that basic attitude is not in itself new.

Afghan's peace process began with the Bonn Agreement (Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions), signed on December 5, 2001, and ended on December 19, 2005, following the election of a new Afghan National Assembly. Significantly, Bonn was not a peace accord but rather an outline of how Afghanistan was going to move forward following two decades of war (Afghan jihad and the civil war of the 1990s). Thus, Bonn called for the formation of an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) mandated to govern Afghanistan for up to six months. After this phase, Afghans established a Transitional Authority, led by Hamid Karzai, with a two-year mandate. Following this period, presidential elections were held in which Karzai won.

Two elements lie at the heart of the Bonn Agreement. First, was a desire by the international community to correct the notion that it had abandoned Afghanistan in 1989 following the Soviet withdrawal. Afghans felt abandoned after they had sacrificed themselves (over a million Afghans died between 1979 and 1988) to defeat the Soviet Union. The international community held that its own neglect of Afghanistan, in failing to help reconstruction, led to the country's descent into civil war followed by the Taliban's rise and its help to al-Qa'ida.

The second factor that emerged was to make the peacebuilding operation, whether military or civilian, as much of an Afghan one as possible. This was out of an appreciation that Afghans do not like to be told what to do combined with the lesson of previous peacekeeping operations excessively driven by external actors. Consequently, Bonn was a quasi-hybrid peacebuilding operation with Afghans and the international community supposedly working in partnership, with the UN serving as the bridge between the two.

The ideas encapsulated in the Bonn Agreement remained consistent in focusing on security sector reform, reconstruction, and reconciliation. Security sector reform has five pillars: building up the Afghan Army (with the United States taking the lead); building up the Afghan National Police (with Germany taking the lead); judicial reform (Italy as the lead nation); counter-narcotic operations (UK as lead nation); and, Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (Japan as the lead nation).

The emphasis on security led to the creation of an international security force, ISAF. ISAF is a product of a decade-long experience by the international community with complex peace operations, which is why the Security Council decided to separate the civilian and military missions, as it realized that security needed its own focus. Consequently, instead of being a UN peacekeeping or peace-enforcing force, ISAF became a "coalition of the willing." This means that nations contribute to the establishment of international force, but not under direct UN supervision, thus making it dependent on voluntary contributions. ISAF encountered many challenges, mainly because it initially focused on Kabul and ensuring that the capital was secure rather than the countryside. ISAF's mission and goal were contradictory, as it had to provide "a secure environment" to allow the Afghan Interim Authority and UN personnel to operate. However, the Bonn program also entrusted primary responsibility for security and law and order with the Afghans, even though the Afghans were far from ready to assume such responsibility. This meant that ISAF had to operate in a way so as to undermine the efforts of the Afghans.

A second goal of Bonn was promoting economic reconstruction, a core feature in any UN operation in the post-Cold War period. The "liberal peace" requires considerable institutional reform to make the state responsive to the demands and needs of citizens: basic security. Brahimi claimed that "economic progress will help legitimize and strengthen new government institutions, and build incentives for rural Afghanistan to link with the center and remain involved in the peace process."

Afghanistan historically has not had a viable economy due to lack of investment, conflict, and the dominance of opium trade. This has meant that Afghans have never really received basic security from their state and government, which was often the instrument of their oppression. Consequently, Afghans are very suspicious of the state and government and especially of Kabul, the seat of power.

To help promote reconstruction, the ISAF developed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These ISAF-led programs sought to coordinate and help the government in the provinces. The first PRT was established in Gardez in December 2002, and since they have spread throughout Afghanistan. Generally speaking, a PRT includes soldiers, diplomats, and civilian experts. The reality, however, has been very different mainly because of the nature and structure of the PRTs. By 2003, the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan moved away from the "light footprint approach" and more toward a typical counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy based on establishing security to permit reconstruction. Theoretically, the approach has solid foundations, but when applied to Afghanistan, questions rise because of the nature of Afghan society (clanism and warlordism) and history. The international community, affected by the interventionist disasters of the 1990s, sought to have Afghans at the heart of the reconstruction process. Ironically, the process that began in Bonn in 2001 achieved the opposite in that, despite the huge investment, Afghanistan has made no real progress in terms of peace and security.

A third issue associated with post-Cold War peacebuilding is reconciliation (or transitional justice). As with the adoption of the Paris Principles in the early 1990s and the "Responsibility to Protect" Doctrine in 2005 by the World Summit, the international community's position has been that building peace demands reconciliation. Since Bonn, there has been a focus on human rights and the need to ensure that Afghanistan complies with various international human rights mechanisms.

In 2005, the Afghanistan National Independent and Reconciliation Commission (known through its Dari abbreviation, PTS) was launched. Its chairman was Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and its aim was to integrate former fighters into Afghan society. The commission provides certificates to former fighters who joined its program, which ensures that they will not face prosecution for any acts committed in the pre-September 11 period. Ahmad Nader Nadery, commissioner on transitional justice with the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights group, has argued that the international community's approach to transitional justice in Afghanistan was not discussed at Bonn, but was instead led by the special representative of the secretary-general, Lakhdar Brahimi who focused on political stabilization as the root for judicial reform (i.e. "peace first, justice later").

This approach helped to undermine the peacebuilding program in Afghanistan, since a number of those who had committed egregious human rights violations in the past--whether during the Afghan jihad, civil war period, or Taliban era--could not be prosecuted. Antonio Donini, former director of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Afghanistan (1999-2002), argues that UNAMA was designed to maneuver between demands that the UN and international community support the Afghan government and ensuring that nothing derails the peace process. This means that human rights concerns must take a subsidiary role as they may undermine the UN's two-pillar approach.

CONCLUSION:

In many respects, peacebuilding in Afghanistan is a doomed project. Although there has been some substantive change in the infrastructure--in the political (election of parliament, adoption of a constitution) or social and economic sphere (building schools, hospitals, sewage as well road construction and electricity), the reality remains that despite billions of dollars in assistance and an escalating international presence, security continues to elude Afghanistan. In 2010, the Afghan government is unable to exercise power in about two-thirds of the country; the Afghan army and police are heavily dependent on coalition forces; corruption pervades all aspects of Afghan society; and opium production, which appears on the wane in 2010, is still a major cash-crop for Afghans.

A core problem with the peacebuilding operation in the Afghanistan is that Afghan leadership, which speaks to two different audiences--domestic and foreign--severely impedes the peacebuilding process. For example, Hamid Karzai appears to supports a Western interpretation of human rights as well as gender equality. However, to obtain needed votes, Karzai, despite Western protests, adopted the Shi'a Family Law that seemed to make Hazara women the property of their husbands. Afghan leaders have always had to compromise and make deals in order to survive.

Incidents of corruption such as the 2009 presidential election or the scandal surrounding the Kabul Bank make it difficult to determine what Afghan leaders stand for besides protecting their own interests. This makes it hard for the international community to devise a strategy for reconstruction, especially when it has pinned hopes on the current leadership, which not only fails to deliver, but arguably benefits by Afghanistan's lack of progress since that guarantees the international presents and aid. The leadership is untrustworthy, fickle, and divisive. Put simply, Hamid Karzai may have been the best choice in 2001, but in 2010 he clearly is the problem. He refuses to implement reform and lead by example; if anything he is guilty of doing the opposite.

Second, it is clear that the Afghan political system developed by the Bonn Process is corrupt and inept. In August 2010, Hamid Karzai fired Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar as deputy attorney-general apparently because he was looking into the activities of Mohammed Zia Salehi, head of the Afghan National Security Council, which meant he was untouchable. Moreover, dissonance between the center and periphery makes any attempt at meaningful reform next to impossible. Those living in the countryside (the majority) reject the Kabul government, which they see as corrupt, inept, and Western-dominated. This is why the insurgency is more than simply Taliban-led but a reaction to the ineffectiveness of the central government. Ultimately, conditions, including the level of insurgency, vary among provinces. Thus, the ISAF has sought to change its tactics. One way to deal with the insurgency is to devolve power, not only to the provinces but also sub-province level.

Third, as most commentators agree, economic poverty and poor social conditions are a root cause of the Afghan insurgency. Due to the high-level of corruption, Afghans often do not receive the international aid that has been allocated to them. This is exacerbated by the lack of security, which also prevents aid from being fully distributed in locations where the insurgency is raging. Moreover, if aid is delivered, insurgents often seize or destroy it. Ordinary Afghans may appreciate the challenge of distributing aid, but ultimately their view is that ISAF and USFOR-A, as well as the hundreds of NGOs, have been in the country for almost a decade and their conditions have not improved. Thus, they are weary of the intervention.

Real reconstruction in Afghanistan requires a debate regarding Pakistan's role and a vital conduit for the development of an Afghan economy. Pakistan must change some of its policies to ensure effective reconstruction in Afghanistan, as Afghan dependency on Pakistan stems from its geography—it is landlocked. This will also benefit Pakistan, as the two are interlinked in that when a problem affects one country it impacts the other. For example, in the 1950s, when there were tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Durand Line, Pakistan simply closed the border. This had a huge impact on the Afghan economy. This situation is true today as much as it was in the 1950s, as seen for example when NATO conveys are attacked in Pakistan thus affecting the campaign in Afghanistan. Thus, the Afghan-Pakistan trade Agreement of June 2010 was a positive development, but as long as Afghanistan lacks basic infrastructure, the benefits of the agreement will not be felt by many Afghans. It also discourages the millions of Afghan refugees living in Pakistan from returning, as they would rather live in the squalor of Peshawar or Karachi than the insecurity of Helmand or Kandahar.

The final issue affecting the peacebuilding effort in Afghanistan from the domestic perspective is human rights. In 2010, Afghanistan's human rights record remains one of the world's worst. Many officials have participated in gross human rights violations. While it is unlikely and unrealistic for Afghanistan to place all those individuals on trial, the violations need to be addressed. The international community excuses such violations despite the talk of a need for protecting and developing universal human rights norms.

On the international front, the peacebuilding process has been undermined by many shortcomings. The ISAF is trying to do too much and faces conflicting tasks. Consequently, security conditions have deteriorated while coalition troops seem to suffer from low morale. Afghan support or the effort has also declined. Whereas in 2001, coalition forces were liberators, increasingly they are seen as occupiers to Afghans who want to evict them, as happened with the Soviets and the British.

Ultimately, the approach of the international community has suffered from typical post-Cold War "liberal peace" arrogance, misunderstanding, lack of an appreciation of the challenge, and poor allocation of resources. Unless this is remedied, the program will continue to provide very little return on investment and reason to hope for an improved situation in Afghanistan.

Dr. Isaac Kfir is a Schusterman Visiting Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship/Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism (INSCT), College of Law, Syracuse University

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