Russia is a fundamental part of Europe, but politics and economics mean its future lies with Asia, said Timofei Bordachev, Program Director of Valdai Club.
Bordachev said, “For Russia, with its unique geopolitical position, it is fundamentally difficult to determine the geographical priorities of its external relations. All the more so because the country’s enormous natural wealth and ability to fully support itself with resources make it unnecessary in principle to consider external relations as a vitally important part of its own development strategy.
“There is no dispute that all of Moscow’s foreign policy declarations over the last two decades have contained a ritual indication that the goal of foreign policy is to ensure the country’s economic development. However, in practice, the foundations on which the Russian state structure stands mean the sincerity of these assurances should be taken with a pinch of salt.
“In reality, Russia – like its main geostrategic adversary the US – is one of only two countries in the world that can survive, at least in the basic senses, by relying entirely on its domestic resources.
“Despite assurances about the importance of foreign economic relations, Moscow sets the true priorities of its foreign policy based not on which opportunities the external environment can provide, but rather on the dangers it can pose to its ability to manage this bounty.
“The result is a foreign policy oriented towards repelling threats in the first instance, and seizing opportunities in the second. And it has to be admitted that it is this insurmountable problem that has confronted many of Russia’s diplomatic undertakings throughout recent years, foremost among which is the pivot to the East, a strategy formulated a decade ago by domestic thinkers and backed up by statements at the highest level.
“The purely materialistic nature of this policy initially had great difficulty interacting with the Russian foreign policy tradition and, more importantly, the system of prioritization. Attempts to convince elites of the need to intensify relations with Asian countries on the basis that this would bring substantial material benefits, faced an objective obstacle – there was no need to try hard in the western direction. This was because material benefits from there came easily, by comparison, relying on the links established over hundreds of years with other major European players. As a result, as of 2019, about 80% of investments in Russia’s Far East were of domestic origin. This region, which is larger than the European Union, has only about 7 million people and is politically centered on the cities of Vladivostok and Khabarovsk.
“Perhaps because of its economic limitations, the eastward pivot strategy in concrete terms has not progressed beyond establishing truly strong ties with China, with which Russia has now begun to address the really crucial issues of the international order. In all other respects the Eastern pivot has remained an important rhetorical but weakly realized field for the Russian state. Over the past ten years, however, Moscow has significantly expanded its presence in various Asian international formats, increased its level of participation in various intergovernmental forums, and begun to think more about the East and understand its place in its own foreign policy system”.
Regarding Russia’s growing relations with China, Timofei Bordachev said:
In turn, ties with China are also difficult to see solely as a product of intensified interactions on the Asian front in the last ten years. The relationship between Moscow and Beijing is strategic in nature, with a shared vision of a more equitable international order that is not dominated by a narrow group of states.
Also, Russia and China share responsibility for the stability of a vast part of Eurasia. Bilateral trade and economic relations are developing with the understanding that at some point the two states will indeed have to jointly oppose attempts by the US and its allies to regain control of the global economy and politics.
Growing relations between Russia and India
While Moscow and New Delhi are enjoying decades-old cordial and time-tested relations, India is already under pressure to switch its foreign policy in accordance with the Western nations and extend total support towards Ukraine.
Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in response to European pressure on the issue of Ukraine said: “We have to be confident about who we are. I think it is better to engage the world on the basis of who we are, rather than try and please the world as a pale imitation of what they are… This idea that others define us, somehow we need to get the approval of other quarters – I think that is an era we need to put behind us”.
India is acknowledged as having its own worldview about major issues in the international arena. The country’s strategic culture includes New Delhi taking hard stances on matters directly challenging national security in the neighborhood; seeking broad economic, political, and cultural interaction within the Indo-Pacific region; positioning itself globally as a great power operating in a multipolar world.
In this context, Ukraine and problems related to the region lie beyond the scope of India’s vital national interests. At the same time, New Delhi is ready to discuss a wide range of issues, including Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other war-torn countries, with Ukraine being a part of broader security agenda, not a cornerstone.
For example, the situation in Afghanistan could be of much greater interest for India. But after the withdrawal of US and allied troops, this issue of global importance turned out to be a marginal one. Nevertheless, from the Indian perspective, its significance actually increased – New Delhi claimed that “in Afghanistan, [the] entire active civil society was thrown under the bus by the world”, with the West turning a blind eye to the developments in Kabul.
Hence, India’s political elites have showed no enthusiasm for discussing Ukraine. Mounting pressure from the West is certain to provoke further irritation in New Delhi.
Ukrainian elites enjoy the full support of the West. At this juncture, they appear to think that those who do not support them ‘in the proper way’ deserve denigration and canceling.
Meaning, Ukrainian elites may love to see Western nations intensifying pressure on India for abandoning its neutral policy towards Ukraine issue and New Delhi’s determination of continuing the decades-old cordial relations with Moscow.
